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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
HAROLD ROBINSON and WILLIAM C. WARD, dba CRYSTAL
PALACE MARKET,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
-vs. -

EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY
ASSURANCE CORPORATION,
LIMITED, a corporation,

Case No.
11,308

'

Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This is an action for indemnity, based upon the
refusal of the defendant to afford automobile liability coverage to the appellants under the loading
and unloading provision of its policy.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek reversal of the summary judgment in the lower court as a matter of law and judgment in their favor as a matter of law for the sum
of $15,000, the amount paid to settle the claim of
Robert E. Kodat and for their costs incurred in the
lower court and on this appeal.
1

I
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On November 10, 1965, Robert E. Kodat filed
suit against Harold Robinson and William C. Ward
dba Crystal Palace Market and demanded of them
damages in the sum of $157,500 arising from personal injuries he received in an accident which allegedly occurred on November 26, 1962, at the premises of the Crystal Palace Market at 238 South
Thirteenth East, Salt Lake City, Utah (R. 29).
Appellants notified defendant Employers' Liability
Corporation (hereinafter called Employers) of the
suit and requested that it afford protection against
Mr. Kodat's claim under the loading and unloading
coverage on the automobile policy provided to Associated Foods, Inc. (R. 115). At the time Employers was notified of the suit, Crystal Palace Market
also notified its general liability insurer, United
Pacific Insurance Company (hereinafter called
United), of the suit of Robert E. Kodat.
When the case was tendered to Employers, it
refused to afford coverage, denying Associated Grocer's truck was being used in unloading (R. 15).
Thereafter, United and Crystal Palace advised
Employers they deemed Employers coverage was
primary under the automobile liability "loading and
unloading" clause and that they would look to Em·
ployers for indemnity.
United employed Raymond M. Berry to appear
and represent Crystal Palace in the defense in Civil
2
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No. 160969. Ultimately, after considerable investigation and negotiation the claim of Robert E. Kodat
was settled for the sum of $15,000.
Plaintiffs and United are seeking to recover
the sum of $15,000 paid to Robert E. Kodat plus
defense costs in the sum of $139.95 incurred in
preparation of Civil No. 160969 (R. 57). The appellants have waived any claim for an attorney's
fee. Plaintiffs claim primary liability was on Employers under the automobile loading and unloading.
ACCIDENT
On November 26, 1962, Robert E. Kodat, employed as a truck driver by Associated Foods, Inc.,
made a delivery to the Crystal Palace Market (R.
29) . On this morning he took a load of staple goods
to Crystal Palace Market at 238 South Thirteenth
East in Salt Lake City, Utah. He arrived at the
Crystal Palace Market at about 7 :00 a.m. (R. 30)
before the Crystal Palace Market was open for business and before its employees had arrived at the
place of business. Mr. Kodat backed his truck up
to the loading dock at the rear of the store.
After backing up to the loading dock, Mr.
Kodat got out of the truck with bills of lading in
his left hand and started to go up the dock to start
checking out his load for the delivery at this address ( R. 30). He had to check the bills of lading
against the goods to be delivered to the Crystal Pal3

ace Market because he had goods for more than one
store upon the truck (R. 31).
To get on the dock, Mr. Kodat allegedly used
the stairway at the north end of the dock. The loading dock is located to the rear or west end of the
store. It is 5'8" high and has approximately eight
steps leading from the ground to the top of the dock.
There is a stairway along the north side of the dock
running from west to east and there is a handrail
along the north side of the stairway. This handrail
is situated so that ordinarily a person walking up
the stairway would have his left hand on the handrail.
In his deposition, Mr. Kodat stated that he had
the bills of lading on a clipboard in his left hand
and that he slipped as he was going onto the dock to
check the load for unloading ( R. 31 ) . It was his
recollection that he fell from about the fourth step.
He was unable to grasp the handrail because of the
clipboard in his left hand. There were no known
eyewitnesses to the accident and the store was not
not scheduled to open until 7 :45 a.m. when employees arrived at work (R. 2). Mr. Kodat's load
was picked up at 6 :00 a.m. at the Associated Grocer's warehouse and it was the practice for truck
drivers to unload their trucks at the markets, including the Crystal Palace Market.

INJURY
In the accident Mr. Kodat claimed to have re4

ceived the following injuries: ( 1) a cracked wrist;
and (2) a back injury (Page 8, Kodat Deposition).
For the back injury he required extensive surgical service. He was operated on by various doctors and the major operation involved a spinal fusion
at L-4, L-5, S-1, and subsequently a second operation was required at this same site to repair the
fusion.
MEDICAL SPECIALS
Mr. Kodat claimed the following medical specials:
L.D.S. Hospital --------------------------------$372.85
Dr. Madison Thomas,
Psychiatrist -------------------------------- 130.00
A. R. Reynolds---------------------------------- 17.33
Dr. Burke Snow ------------------------------ 364.00
Dr. Dalton ---------------------------------------- 150.00
Dr. Capel ------------------------------------------ 435.00
Pharmacy ---------------------------------------6.80
Cottonwood Hospital (estimated) __ 350.00
$1,843.98
(R. 59)
LOSS OF EARNINGS
Mr. Kodat claimed to have been making $100
per week and estimated his loss of wages as approximately $5,000 (R. 37).
STATE INSURANCE FUND
At the time of the accident, Mr. Kodat was covered by workmen's compensation insurance with the
State Insurance Fund. The State Insurance Fund
5

spent $10,269.84 on his behalf for compensation and
medical. Thereafter, the State Insurance Fund
joined with the plaintiff in instituting Civil No.
160969 against Harold Robinson and William C.
Ward dba Crystal Palace Market (R. 59).
RESPONDENT'S LIABILITY COVERAGE
Employers was the carrier for the automobile
liability insurance on the trucks owned, operated
and used by Associated Foods, Inc. Their policy afforded coverage in the sum of $300,000 for injuries
to any one person in any one accident on the date
of the injury to Mr. Kodat. The pertinent provisions
of defendant's insurance policy other than the limits
are as follows:
Insuring agreement 1 provided:
"I. Coverage A - Bodily Injury Liability
To pay on behalf of the insured all sums which
the insured shall become legally obligated to
pay as damages because of bodily injury,
sickness or disease, including death at any
time resulting therefrom, sustained by any
person, caused by accident and arising out of
the ownership, maintenance or use of the automobile.
II. Defense, Settlement, Supplementary Payments
With respect to such insurance as is afforded
by this policy for bodily injury liability and
6

for property damage liability, the company
shall
(a) defend any suit against the insured alleging such injury, sickness, disease or destruction and seeking damages on account
thereof, even if such suit is groundless, false
or fraudulent; but the company may make
such investigation, negotiation and settlement
of any claim or suit as it deems expedient.
III. Definition of Insured
(a) With respect to the insurance for bodily
injury liability and for property damage liabliity, the unqualified word 'insured' includes
the names insured, and, if the named insured
is an individual, his spouse, if a resident of
the same household, and also includes any person while using the automobile and any person
or organization legally responsible for the use
thereof, provided the actual use of the automobile is by the named insured or such spoose
or with the permission of either. The insur<Uic e
with respect to any person or organization
other than the named insured or such spouse
does not apply:
( 1) to any person or organization or to any
agent or employee thereof, operating an automobile sales agency, repair shop, service station, storage garage or public parking place,
with respect to any accident arising out of the
operation thereof, but this provision does not
apply to a resident of the same household as
the named insured, to a partnership in which
such resident or the named insured is a partner, or to any partner, agent or employee of
7

such resident or partnership.
(2) to any employee with respect to mJury
to or sickness, disease or death of another
employee of the same employer, injured in
the course of such employment in an accident
arising out of the maintenance or use of the
automobile in the business of such employer."
With respect to the conditions, Section 26, Purposes of Use defines:
" ( c) Use of the automobile for the purposes
stated includes the loading and unloading
thereof."
Condition 6 reads:
"Severability of Interests. Coverages A and
B. The term 'the insured' is used severally
and not collectively, but the inclusion herein
of more than one insured shall not operate to
increase the limits of the company's liability."
(R. 16-18).
GENERAL LIABILITY POLICY
United, under policy No. CLP 52602, effective
from 9-10-62 to 1-10-63, under Coverage A, afforded
Crystal Palace Market $50,000 coverage for injuries
to any one person arising from any one accident.
This policy, like the policy of Employers, provides
for supplementary defense costs.
The other insurance clause of the general liability policy of United is as follows:
"14. Other Insurance 8

Coverages A and B.

If the insured has other insurance against a
loss covered by this policy, the company shall
not be ~iable under this policy for a greater
proportion of such loss than the applicable
limit of liability stated in the declaration bears
to the total applicable limit of liability of all
valid and collectible insurance against such
loss, provided, however, that the insurance
shall (a) not apply, Division 2, to the extent
that any valid and collectible insurance, whether on a primary, excess of contingent basis, is
available to the insured with respect to loss
arising oitt of the ownership, maintenance,
operation, use, loading or unloading of (1)
any automobile at the premises or the ways
im11iediately adjoining, or (2) watercraft,
and (b) be excess insurance ( 1) over any
other valid and collectible insurance with respect to temporary substitute, hired or nonowned automobiles, or * * *." (R. 25).

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE INJURY TO ROBERT E. KODAT AROSE
FROM THE LOADING AND UNLOADING OF
THE TRUCK INSURED BY RESPONDENT.

Loading and unloading are words of expansion.
They were intended by the underwriters to cover
liability when the truck was stationary, otherwise
the phrase is meaningless in the policy.
Loading begins when the truck crew receives
the merchandise at the Associated Grocer's warehouse and the unloading operation is not completed
until the merchandise is removed from the truck
9

by the driver of the truck or employees of the consignee.
Any use of the truck between the time loading
is starting and prior to the completion of unloading
is covered.
Each case must be considered with respect to
the facts involved. Utah has adopted the modern
liberal view in interpreting the loading and unloading phrase.
In Pacific Auto Insurance Co. vs. Commercial
Casualty Insurance Co., ( 1945), 108 Utah 500, 161
P.2d 423, coverage was afforded under the automoble liability coverage for claims being made by a
blind man who had walked into an open manhole.
In this case employees of a brewing company were
delivering regularly to a restaurant. They parked
the truck at the curb, took some kegs of beer off
the truck and placed them on the sidewalk. Thereafter, the truck crewman went into the building and
opened the manhole or trapdoor in the sidewalk to
which the kegs of beer were loaded into the basement
of the building by means of an elevator. While the
beer kegs were being taken into the basement, the
blind man fell into the open manhole. The question
for determination was whether under the policy of
insurance the lowering of kegs into the basement
constituted a part of the process of unloading the
truck. Answering the question in the affirmative
the court said:
10

"The policy of the plaintiff was written, not
to cover the trucks, not to protect the trucks
but to protect and cover the risks of the Brew:
~ng Company's business in the operation of
its trucks. The policy specifies that the truck
is to be used only in the business of the Brewing Company, including loading and unloading of the trucks in making commercial deliveries. Commercial delivery as a matter of
common knowledge includes taking the articles from their usual place of storage or assembly to the place of destination and turning
them over to the control or possession of the
purchaser or receiver. Sometimes delivery
may be made by depositing things on the sidewalk or on a platform or other convenient
place. That, however, is usually indicated by
the custom of the business or agreement of
the parties. Normally a delivery is not completed until the deliveror has finished his
handling of the article, has completed his assignment or task of putting the articles into
the possession of the receiving party."
The foregoing case also holds there must be
some causal relationship between the use of the
insured vehicle and the accident for which recovery
is sought. The case does show that the injury or
damage need not be directly caused by the truck or
automobile and that the requirement is satisfied,
as to causal relationship, if there is some connection
with the injury and the use of the vehicle.
Since the words loading and unloading are words
of expansion in a liability policy, most courts correctly find coverage for omnibus insureds for acci11

dents arising out of loading and unloading hazards,
without regard to whether or not the injury arose
from being struck or injured by the truck.

Wagnian vs. American Fidelity & Casualty
Co., ( 1952), 304 N.Y. 490, 109 N.E. 2d 592, is a
leading case which has attracted a lot of comment.
In this case a stranger claimed coverage under the
automobile liability policy issued to the owner of the
truck for injury caused to him by another stranger.
Wagman, the stranger seeking coverage, was an employee of Bond Stores in New York and Bond Stores
were insured under a general liability policy which
did not cover as an insured, their employees. A trucking concern was insured for automobile liability coverage with American Fidelity & Casualty Co. and
this policy covered as an insured any person using
(loading and unloading) the automobile and any
person legally responsible for such use. The truck
insured was employed by Bond Stores to transport
garments from one of its stores to another. The
truck was parked at the curb in front of a store at
the time of the accident. Two of Bond's employees
rolled a rack of clothing across the sidewalk to the
curb line and garments from the rack were handed
to a helper inside the truck who arranged them on a
rack in the truck. The driver and the helper were
employeers of the trucker and did not leave the truck.
None of Bonds employees entered the truck or
brought garments further than the curb line. Bond's
store manager, Mr. Wagman, the stranger who
12

sought coverage, was on the sidewalk counting aI'ltl
checking garnients and supervising the pickup but
did not participate in the actual movement of garments. While the manager, \Vagman, was on his way
back to the store to check for further goods to be
shipped, he bumped into a pedestrian, causing her to
fall on the sidewalk and sustain serious personal injories. A declaratory judgment action was instituted
by Wagman and he was held to be an insured under
the omnibus clause of the truck policy because of
the loading and unloading clause of the policy. The
court said loading and unloading embraces not only
immediate transfer of goods to and from the vehicle
but the complete operation of transferring the garments between the vehicle and the place to or from
which they are to be moved and such coverage was
not precluded because of the fact that no employee
of the trucker was involved because the omnibus
clause extends coverage to anyone using the truck
and the manager was so using it at the time of the
accident.
McCloskey and Co. vs. Allstate Insurance Co.,
(1966), U.S. Cir. Ct. App., Dist. of Col., 358 F.2d
544, discloses the argument generally made against
affording coverage. A favorite argument of the automobile liability insurer for not affording coverage
for loading and unloading is that the accident was
not caused by the truck. In this case Allstate argued
the general contractor was not entitled to coverage
under the auto liability clause for loading and un13

loading because Mawyer, the foreman for the subcontractor who was injured, was charged by the
contractor with unloading steel at the time he was
struck. Mawyer was struck by a clamshell bucket
of a crane owned by McCloskey at a time Mawyer
was supervising the placing of timbers on the ground
to form a platform for the steel to be placed upon
once actual unloading was started. The lower court
ruled against McCloskey and Company, but on appeal it was reversed and the court said that where all
major preparatory acts, except the attachment of a
sling to a crane, were under way or completed, that
loading and unloading had commenced within the
meaning of the standard loading and unloading
clause even though no steel had been moved.

Continental Casualty Co. vs. Du/fy et al.,
(1966) 26 A.D. 2d 60, 272 NYS 2d 470, shows that
it is causally connected if the accident arises because
the truck is on the premises to be unloaded without
regard to whether or not the truck is a tool or piece
of equipment causing the accident. In this case use
of the truck did not cause the accident. However,
the court held there was coverage for the owner of
the tavern under the truck owner's liability policy.
In this case the seller of whiskey had a driver making a delivery at a tavern at a time when wind blew
doors over striking the driver. Prior to starting the
unloading the driver had opened the doors of the
tavern and there was no bar to brace them so they
would not blow over. The court had no difficulty
14

in finding a direct causal connection between the
accident and unloading and noted that if the driver
had not been on the premises, the doors would not
have struck him.

Float-Away Door Co. vs. Continental Casualty
Co., (1967) 5th Cir. 372 F.2d 701, supports the view
that the words loading and unloading are words of
expansion. In this case Float-Away loaded a trailer
owned by Dance at a factory in Georgia. Continental had the auto liability coverage on Dance. The
trailer was delivered to Universal Manufacturing
Co. in Ohio. At the time it was being unloaded, an
employee of Universal was seriously injured. The
employee sued Dance and Float-Away for negligence.
Continental admitted coverage for Dance but declined to defend Float-Away. Action was commenced
by Float-Away for declaratory judgment and the
court held that Float-Away was using the truck and
entitled to coverage under Dance's automobile liability policy even though the accident occurred in
Ohio many miles and many hours from the time
Float-Away did the loading.
In Hertz Corp. vs. Bellin, (1967), 280 A.D. 2d
1101, 284 NYS 2d 140, an employee was returning
to the truck with an empty dolly and struck a person injuring him. The court held there was coverage
for injury under the loading and unloading and that
the phrase "loading and unloading" covered the entire operation of making pickups and deliveries.
15

lVashington Insurance Corp. vs. Maher, (PA
1942), 31 Del. Co. 755, 160 ALR 1272, involves the
movement of beer. In this case a truck driver parked
his vehicle in front of a restaurant so he might
remove beer kegs from the basement. He went into
the basement, rolled the kegs along the floor to a
point near the sidewalk pavement where he left the
kegs at the foot of the stairs which led from the
basement to the sidewalk. He went up the stairs and
pushed the sidewalk door open and as the door was
pushed open it struck a pedestrian causing injury.
This was held covered because the truck driver was
on the premises to make a delivery and that this
was sufficient causal connection without the injured
party being struck by the truck.
Thompson Heating Corp. vs. Hardware Indemnity Insurance Co., (1944) 74 Ohio App. 350, 58
NE2d 809, involved injuries to a pedestrian who
tripped over a hose over a parked truck across the
sidewalk into a building into which granulated rock
wool insulation was being blown. At the time of the
accident the blower was unattached to the truck, but
nevertheless, the provision for loading and unloading was held to cover the claims being made.
Bobier vs. National Casualty Co., (1944), 143
Ohio St. 215, 54 NE2d 798, is another Ohio case
showing that in an expansion clause of this type
you endeavor to interpret the policy to afford coverage. In this case the insured's employees were
carrying a stove from the furniture store of the third
16

party preparing to load it into one of the insured's
trucks and in doing so damaged a davenport, the
property of the store owner. The court said there
was coverage and stated:
'.'From a considerCI:tion of the entire policy,
it seems clear that it was the intention of the
parties to cover liability arising in some incidences when the truck was stationary. Unless
this be true, the provision as to loading and
unloading is meaningless as it could hardly
be claimed that loading or unloading would
take place while the truck was in motion....
We think that the loading begins when the
employees of the plaintiff connected with the
truck receive the article as part of the continuing operaton, place it on the truck. ... "

Raff el vs. Travelers Indemnity Co., ( 1954),
141 Conn. 389, 106 A.2d. 716, involved a situation
where a store sent a roll of linoleum which would contain more than the amount needed to do a job with
the understanding that it would call back and pick
up the remainder. The roll, about six feet long and
weighing two to three hundred pounds, was delivered
to an enclosed porch and stood on end near the
front door of the house. Some hours later it fell and
seriously injured a ten year old girl. This was a
case of first impression in Connecticut, and the court
held there was coverage in adopting the completed
operations rule.
The causal connection was that the truck
brought the linoleum to the premises.
17

Industrial Indemnity Co. vs. General Insurance
Co. of America, ( 1962), 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 568, holds
there is coverage where the accident was not caused
by the truck. In this case a truck insured under an
automobile liability policy was delivering a load of
concrete pipe to the job site. The truck driver requested and received the assistance of a crane owned
by the contractor which was operated by the contractor's employee to effect the unloading. The truck
driver affixed a pipe hook to a section of pipe and
then signaled the crane operator to lift the pipe.
While the section of pipe was being removed, the
truck driver, standing on the bed of the truck, was
injured when struck by a section of pipe being lifted
by the crane. Thereafter, the truck driver brought
action against the crane operator and the contractor,
and they in turn sought coverage from the liability
carrier on the truck.
In the declaratory judgment suit which followed, the District Court of Appeals in California
held:
"1. That a person loading or unloading the
truck is using the truck within the meaning
of the automobile liability policy covering the
truck and is, therefore, an additional insured
under the policy.
2. That while the truck here did not form a
legal basis of liability to the truck driver, the
truck insurer was obligated to defend and
indemnify the crane operator and !ts ?W~~rs
as additional insureds because their hab1hty
18

to the truck driver was incurred while using
the truck.
3. That while the contractor's liability policy
covered the contractor, the negligent crane operator was not covered by the policy as an additional insured and, therefore, that the truck
policy under which the crane operator was
covered was primary since the only insurance
company covering a negligent employee is
deemed primary over a policy covering a person vicariously liable so that the truck insurer
was obligated to furnish a defense to the action against the crane operator and its owners."
Travelers Insurance Co. vs. W. F. Saunders
Sons, Inc., ( 1963), 18 A.D. 2d 162, 238 NYS 2d
495, shows the injury did not have to be caused by
the truck for coverage to be effective for loading
and unloading. In this case a workman was injured
when a crane owned by a subcontractor tipped over
while being used to convey concrete in a bucket from
a transit truck to the place of pour. The court applied the completed operations test and stated that
since the truck had to necessarily remain at the place
it was until the unloading was completed, it was
necessarily being used in the unloading process. The
case is significant because it shows coverage exists
when the truck is at the premises of the consignee
awaiting for work to be done that is customarily a
part of the unloading process.
Drew Chemical Corp. vs. American Fore Loyal-

ty Group, (1966), 90 N.J. Supp. 582, 218 A.2d 875,
19

is another case where the truck is in the unloading process even though actual unloading has
not started. In this case Byford, an employee of
Nappi, the owner of the tank truck company, drove
the truck to the premises of Drew Chemical for the
purpose of delivering a fatty acid liquid. Byford
was injured while steam under pressure was being
run through Drew's 18 foot hose to dislodge an impediment so that the unloading of the acid could
begin. Byford was covered by workmen's compensation from his employer, Nappi. Byford instituted
suit against Drew, alleging Evans, an employee of
Drew, was negligent in causing the accident. The
policy involved defined use of the automobile to include the loading and unloading thereof. The court
construed the meaning and scope of the words loading and unloading using the completed operations
test as used by this court in Pacific Auto Insurance
Co. vs. Commercial Casualty Insurance Co., supra,
and said that all that was necessary to establish coverage was that the act or omission resulted in an
injury which was necessary to carry out the unloading of the truck.
Loading begins when the truck which receives
the merchandise to place aboard. The unloading operation does not end until the merchandise is removed
from the truck. In this case the loading began when
Mr. Kodat received the merchandise at the Associated Grocers warehouse on the morning of the accident. It was not ended until all merchandise from
20

the truck had been unloaded. Any use of the truck
prior to the completion of the unloading process is
within defendant's coverage.
Parking the truck and taking the bill of lading
up to check out the load were preparatory acts necessary to complete in the unloading process. The backing of the truck up to the dock and the parking of
it was a start of the preparatory act of unloading.
The injury to Mr. Kodat was causally connected to
the unloading. Except for being on the premises to
unload the truck the accident would not have happened.
Kodat's injury in this case was casually connected with the unloading in the same manner as
Mawyer's injury was casually connected in McCloskey and Co. vs. Allstate Insurance Co., supra, when
Mawyer was placing timber to unload steel upon. It
is causally connected just as Duffy's injury was in
the case of Continental Casualty Co. vs. Duffy, supra,
when he was struck by the tavern doors.
If Kodat had not been carrying the bill of lad-

ing in his left hand he could have used the hand rail
and the accident would not have happened. As such,
for this reason it is not reasonable to think unloading
was not causally connected to the accident.
Some courts have taken the view that under
the facts as stated in Pacific Auto Insurance Co. vs.
Commercial Security Insurance Co., supra; Wagman
vs. American Fidelity and Casualty Co., supra; Mc21
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Closkey and Co. vs. Allstate Insurance Co., supra;
Continental Casualty Co. vs. Duffy, supra, and this
case, there would be no casual connection to the accident with unloading. The courts that have taken
this narrow view of loading and unloading have erred
in that they are considering coverage only afforded
if the injury is proximately caused by the loading
or unloading process. This narrow view is not necessary as the words loading and unloading are words
of expansion, and it is only necessary to find some
causal connection with loading and unloading to
afford coverage. Nothing in the automobile liability
policy requires the accident be proximately caused
by use of the truck.
POINT II.
THE AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY POLICY AFFORDS PRIMARY COVERAGE FOR LOADING
AND UNLOADING.

The other insurance clause in United's general
liability policy provides that its policy will be excess
coverage over any other valid and collectible auto
liability insurance. United's general liability policy
provided that any insurance afforded by its policy
should not apply to the extent there was any valid
and collectible insurance available to the insured
with respect to loss arising out of the ownership,
maintenance, operation, use, loading or unloading
of any automobile at the premises or the ways immediately adjoining.

Russell vs. Poulson, ( 1966), 18 Utah 2d 157,
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417 P.2d 658, discusses the effect of an excess other
insurance clause. In this case the court sustained
the effect of the excess other insurance clause holding that the policy on the vehicle in which the injured
plaintiff was riding was primary.
POINT III.
EMPLOYERS HAS WAIVED ITS RIGHT TO
QUESTION THE REASONABLENESS OF THE
SETTLEMENT.

The law does not look with favor upon insurers
who breach their duty to their insureds. Defending
an insured is an obligation that insurance companies
should be encouraged to accept and discouraged from
avoiding. Good faith requires that an insurance company not be given two opportunities to avoid an
obligation. To permit an insurer to question the
reasonableness of a settlement made by an insured
after the insured has had to defend because of a
breach of duty is not reasonable.
The question of reasonableness of the settlement
made only relates to the question of indemnification.
Once a duty to defend is breached the insurer becomes liable to indemnify the insured for the entire
loss resulting from the breach. The insurer cannot
rely upon the policy provisions it has breached to
limit is obligation, duty, or liability.
This is a case involving a breach of contract.
Damages for breach of contract are based upon the
concept of what damages were reasonably forseeable
and what loss would naturally and usually follow.
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In Pacific Coast Title Insurance Co. vs. Hartford '
AccUlent & Indemnity Co., (1958), 7 Utah 2d 377,
325 P.2d 906, this court said following Hadley vs.
Baxendale, 9 Exch. 41, 157 Eng. Rep. ( 1854) and
Restatement of Contracts, Section 330 stated:
"The rule as to what damages are recoverable '
for breach of contract is based upon the concept of reasonable forseeability that loss of
such general character would result from the
breach. Therefore, to be compensable, the loss
must result in the breach in the natural and ,
usual course of events, so that it can fairly
and reasonably be said that if the minds of
parties had adverted to breach when the contract was made, the loss of such character
would have been within their contemplation." '
Ninety-five per cent of all personal injury lawsuits are settled. It seems as a matter of law it must
have been within the contemplation of the parties
that the insured would settle a $157,500 lawsuit for
$15,000 rather than run the expense of trial and
the possibility or probability of a higher judgment
being rendered.
Recent cases support the proposition that an insurance company is liable for all damages that follow from a consequence of a breach.
In California in 1955 in Richie vs. Anchor Casualty Co., (1955), 286 P.2d 1000, the District Court
of Appeals held the insured was entitled to make a
compromise settlement after the duty to defend was
breached by the insurer.
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Richie vs. Anchor Casualty Co., supra, is authority an insured does not have to risk trial.
Since 1955, the law regarding the duty to indemnify and make the insured whole has advanced
in many jurisdictions.

In Theodore vs. Zurich General Accident & Liability Insurance Co., (1961), Alas. 364 P.2d 51, an
insured was faced with a $1,000,000 lawsuit on a
claim obstensibly from facts known to be within the
te1·ms of the policy coverage. However, the insurer
ref used to take part in litigation and the insured
reached a settlement by way of confession of a judgment in the amount of $20,000 without trial. The
court said that since Zurich had the obligation to
defend and refused to do so, the amount of the settlement made by entry of judgment became binding
against Zurich both as to the extent and existence
of liability. Therefore, Zurich did not have the right
to show the settlement was unreasonable because
Theodore was not covered by the employer's liability
section of the policy.
On October 25, 1966, the Supreme Court of the
State of California decided two cases of importance.
In Lowell vs. Maryland Casualty Co., (1966), 54
Cal. Rptr. 116, 419 P.2d 180, the insured refused
to defend as the pleadings asserted an assault and
battery. However, there was a defense of self defense and if true, this would make the claim of the
plaintiff groundless. The Supreme Court in revers25

ing a judgment in favor of the insurer stated the
sole issue should be on damages. There was an issue
of fact because attorneys' fees were being claimed.
In the other California case, Gray vs. Zurich,
(1966), 54 Cal. Rptr. 104, 419 P.2d 168, Zurich Insurance Co. presented the insured with a dilemma.
In this case Dr. Gray, the insured, was charged with
willfully, maliciously, brutally and intentionally assaultng a Mr. Jones in Missouri. Dr. Gray notified
Zurich of the case and requested that it defend him.
Zurich refused to defend on the ground the complaint alleged an intentional tort outside the coverage. Dr. Gray claimed that he did not intentionally, willfully or maliciously injure Jones. He
claimed self defense for his acts. The Supreme Court
of California, sitting in bank, held there was a duty
to defend and that Zurich had breached its duty. The
court said:
"Since modern procedural rules focus on facts
of the case rather than theory of recovery in
the complant, the duty to defend should be
fixed by facts the insurer learns from the co!ll·
plaint, the insured or other sources. An msurer, therefore, bears a duty to defend an
insured whenever it ascertains facts which
give rise to the potential liability und~r t!1e
policy. In the instant case the complamt itself, as well as the facts known to the insurer,
sufficiently apprised the insurer of these possibilities hence we need not set out when a.nd
upon what other occasions the duty of an ~n
sured to ascertain such possibilities otherwise
arising."
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Dr. Gray was unsuccessful in his claim of self
defense. Thereafter, Zurich Insurance Co. claimed
that it had no duty to indemnify Dr. Gray for the
sum owed Mr. Jones inasmuch the defense of self
defense was not accepted. The court said that Zurich
could not whittle down its obligation to the plaintiff
on the theory that the plaintiff himself was of such
limited financial ability that he could not afford to
employ able counsel or present every reasonable defense or to carry his cause to the highest court having jurisdiction. The court reversed the judgment
in favor of Zurich in the intermediate court and instructed damages to be fixed by including the amount
of the judgment in the Jones suit against Gray, the
costs, expenses and attorney's fees incurred defending such suit without regard to the question of reasonableness. The court was told to take evidence on
damages only as to the amount of the judgment in
Jones' suit, the costs, the expenses and attorney's
fees incurred in defending such suit.
Quoting from Arenson vs. National Auto & Casualty Insurance Co., (1957), 48 Cal. 2d 528, 539,
310 P.2d 961, 968, the court said:
"Having defaulted such agreement the company is manifestly bound to reimburse its insured for the full amount of any obligation
reasonably incurred by him. It will not be
allowed to defeat or whittle down its obligation on the theory that the plaintiff himself
was of such limited financial ability that he
could not afford to employ able counsel or to
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p~esent every rea.sonable defense, or to carry
his c~u~e ;o the high~st court having jurisdicton,
· · . Sustammg such a theory * * *
would tend * * * to encourage insurance comp~nies to si~ilar disayowals of responsibility
with everythmg to gam and nothing to lose."
In Missionaries of the Company of Mary, Inc.
vs. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., ( 1967), Conn.,
230 A.2d 21, the insurer breached its contract by
an unqualified refusal to defend an action against l
its insured claiming the claim was within an exclu- !
sion of the policy. The case was settled and an action
was brought for the amount of this settlement plus
expenses and attorney's fees. The court said that
where a breach to defend existed the insurance com- I
pany could not thereafter question the settlement or •
seek to show that it had no duty to indemnify as
the loss was excluded and allowed recovery in full
for the amount of the settlement from the insurer.
I

In Kong Yick Investment Co. vs. Maryktnd Casualty Co., (1967), ____ Wash. ____ , 423 P.2d 935, a
claim was made against Kong Yick arising from a
pedestrian being struck by a pane of glass which
fell from Kong Yick's building. Maryland Casualty
Co. refused to accept the defense claiming its policy
did not cover the sidewalk at the location where
the accident occurred. The Washington Court held
that the policy was ambiguous and that in such a
situation the insured was entitled to coverage. Kong
Yick's attorney settled the claim of the pedestrian,
Somerville, and brought suit to recover the amount
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of the settlement. The court held it was the defendant Maryland Casualty's duty to defend the Somerville action and that having failed to do so it was
liable to the plaintiff to make the plaintiff whole
and directed judgment for the plaintiff be entered
in accordance with the prayer of the complaint.
In this case it is admitted that the sum of $15,000 was paid to Kodat and that the legal costs were
expended. In the lower court appellants withdrew
their claim for attorney's fees to eliminate the factual question on reasonableness of attorney's fees.
Settlement of the lawsuit of Kodat vs. Crystal
Palace Market was a consequence that Employers
could reasonably contemplate as arising from its
breach to defend. Therefore, as a matter of law
Employers should be barred from trying to profit
from the breach of failing to defend by claiming
the amount of the settlement was unreasonable.
If Employers is allowed to question the amount
of the settlement, it and other insurance companies
will have reason to believe nothing is to be lost and
something may be gained by ref using a defense.

CONCLUSION
If an insured has both an automobile liability
policy and a general liability polcy which will afford
defenses, the insured has a right to expect both companies will be anxious and willing to defend. An insurance company should never be given an oppor29

tunity to gain as a result of breaching an obligation
to an insured.
The lower court should be reversed and directed
as a matter of law to enter judgment in favor of
the appellants for the amount of the settlement and
legal costs incurred because :
1. The accident occurred during the preparatory process for unloading.

2. The accident was causally connected with
unloading.
3. The entire operation of delivery of goods is
part of unloading of the unloading process.
4. Employers coverage was primary.
5. Employers breached its duty to defend.
Respectfully submitted,
WORSLEY, SNOW &
CHRISTENSEN
Raymond M. Berry
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
and Appellants
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NOTICE

Raymond M. Berry, being first duly sworn,
states that he served two copies of the Appellants'
Brief upon the defendant by mailing same to Shirley
P. Jones, Jr., Attorney at Law, 510 American Oil
Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, by United States
mail, postage prepaid, this ________ day of ______________________ ,
1968.
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